Hume and Montesquieu: Thoughts on Eighteenth-Century Government

 

Hume and Montesquieu: Thoughts on Eighteenth-Century Government

 

    This essay is an examination of Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de la Brède et de Montesquieu, and David Hume’s analysis of eighteenth-century government in Europe. The essential publications for this endeavor are Hume’s Essays, Moral and Political, a collection of dissertations initially released in 1752, and Montesquieu’s Spirit of Laws, first published in 1748. Although their compositions appear complementary, each philosopher historian contradicts one another and, sometimes within a single treatise, himself.  In essence, Montesquieu focused on the types of European government prevalent in the eighteenth century, while Hume, a Scottish philosopher historian, discussed the character of those respective governments. Both men expressed an interest in republican and aristocratic forms of governance.

    According to Jeffrey Church in an essay titled “Selfish and Moral Politics: David Hume on Stability and Cohesion in the Modern State,” Hume posited “that in political life human beings act based largely on self-interest and a limited generosity.”[1] Nevertheless, Hume remained skeptical of the prevailing “selfish theory.” This philosophy, proposed by Thomas Hobbes in the seventeenth century, postulates that all human decisions are explainable in terms of self-interest or egoism. Church concluded that scrutiny of Hume’s writing indicates that he disavowed “the selfish theory in his moral philosophy, but... claims that the selfish theory is a reasonable premise for a political scientist or a statesman.”[2] For Hume, “the great question” regarding government is not necessarily the form or type of administration, an absolute monarchy, or a republic, for example, but rather the “character and conduct of the governors.”[3]

    “Nothing is more surprising to those, who consider human affairs with a philosophical eye,” stated Hume in an essay on government, “than to see the easiness with which the many are governed by the few. . . .”[4] The republican and aristocratic forms of government provide excellent examples; for instance, according to Montesquieu’s “Of Laws Directly Derived from the Nature of Government,” a republic is governed by representatives chosen from the populace at-large. However, he continues, “When the body of the people is possessed of the supreme power, it is called a democracy. When the supreme power is lodged in the hands of a part of the people, it is then an aristocracy.”[5] He further states that the laws and regulations determining the manner of the vote and who can participate are inseparable from republican government. Regardless, Hume believed that because “force is always on the side of the governed,” ruling administrations must rely upon customary assumptions to assert control; therefore, the government is founded “on opinion only,”[6] Hume further advised: “this maxim extends to the most despotic and the most military governments as well as to the most free and most popular.”[7]

    Both philosopher historians examined the characteristics of a national government controlled by a sovereign. In contrast to republicanism, a single individual, the prince, is entrusted with the administration of a monarchy. Montesquieu’s essay titled “Of the Relation of Laws to the Nature of Monarchical Government” asserts that the monarch exercised authority via three lines of communication, each functioning simultaneously underneath the crown: the intermediate, subordinate, and the dependent. Royal authority is transmitted to the people via the middle path. Hence, Montesquieu stipulates that the nobility is best suited to occupy both the intermediate and the dependent pathways. Meanwhile, the exercise of royal power via rule-of-law distinguishes a sovereign from a despot. According to Montesquieu, “no monarch, no nobility; no nobility, no monarch; but there may be a despotic prince.”[8]

    In an essay titled “Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences,” Hume asserted: “An absolute prince, that is barbarous, renders all his ministers and magistrates as absolute as himself.”[9] In addition, he opined that the arts and sciences are unable to prosper unless the “people enjoy the blessing of a free government.”[10] Hume concluded:

            To expect, therefore, that the Arts and Sciences should ever take their first rise in a monarchy, is to expect a contradiction. Before these refinements have been studied, the monarch is ignorant and barbarous; and, not having knowledge sufficient to make him sensible of the necessity of balancing his government upon general laws, he delegates his full powers to all inferior magistrates. This barbarous policy debases the people, and for ever prevents all improvement.[11]

 

           Regardless, a republic devoid of law has no prospect of permanence. Hume’s essay, therefore, argues that even a “barbarous” republic results in the formation of laws and, consequently, these laws result in the sequential establishment of security, curiosity, and ultimately knowledge. Nevertheless, he conceded: “Thus it is evident that the two extremes of absolute monarchy and of a republic, approach very near to each other. . . . In the first, the magistrate has no jealousy of the people: in the second, the people have no jealousy of the magistrate.”[12]

    According to Charles-Louis, a republic’s elected delegates are naturally endowed with the ability to debate current affairs. The responsibility of selecting representatives to the legislature resides exclusively with the people; notwithstanding, Montesquieu posits that the populace is incapable of deliberative debate. Hence, the importance of electing a trusted legislator answerable to their local constituents. Montesquieu provides yet another caveat to his argument: “All the inhabitants... ought to have a right of voting at the election of a representative, except such as are in so mean a situation as to be deemed to have no will of their own.”[13] The Spirit of Laws also recognizes that part of the population, the aristocracy, is characterized by privilege, especially wealth. In remedy thereof, a bicameral assembly of hereditary noblemen and elected commoners ought to conduct “their assemblies and deliberations apart,” concerned with “their separate views and interests.”[14]

    The leader of a dictatorial government, according to Charles-Louis in the essay “Of the Laws in relation to the Nature of a despotic Government,” is a “naturally lazy, voluptuous, and ignorant” tyrant.[15] An unfettered autocrat neglectful of his responsibility, convinced of his superiority, and certain his people amount to naught. Moreover, his inner circle is prone to factionalism and discord. Montesquieu, therefore, suggests the appointment of a trusted prime minister, one delegated the authority to govern; in essence, “the creation of a vizir is a fundamental law of this government.”[16]  The type of governance notwithstanding, Montesquieu offers two stipulations: first, liberty is confined to temperate governments, and second, “power should be a check to power.”[17] Consequently, an ideal government, regardless of variety, is in possession of independent executive, judicial, and legislative authority.

    According to Hume: “the constitutional powers” evident in a given regime must be organized “to check each other, ensuring that none came to dominate the others. . . .”[18] Without such an arrangement, powerful interests would inevitably abuse their authority. Charles-Louis further stipulated: “The judiciary power ought not to be given to a standing senate; it should be exercised by persons taken from the body of the people... consistently with a form and manner prescribed by law” whilst dispensing justice “conformable to the letter of the law.”[19] A criminal or civil case, per Montesquieu’s estimation, consequently, requires adjudication by a magistrate and jury of one’s peers. Judgment should be issued free from opinion or animosity. Exceptions flourish under certain circumstances; for instance, he insists that the common people are envious of nobility. 

    “The executive power ought to be in the hands of a monarch,” says Montesquieu, “because this branch of government... is better administered by one than by many;” conversely, the assembly is best controlled by the gathering of delegates.[20] The executive should not participate in public discourse, especially as the crown can veto legislative actions. Furthermore, the foresight to summon and subsequently prorogue the legislature, and thus preclude their descent into the despotic, is naturally within the sovereign’s purview. Meanwhile, per Sagar’s analysis, Hume concluded that “What mattered,” is that all forms of government must be “moderate,” and that blending temperance “with a system of fair trials,” naturally resulted in, “liberty for ordinary people.” Sagar also concluded that Hume believed there was “no reason that monarchy could not be a moderate regime and hence one that afforded liberty. . . .”[21] Afterall, Hume in his Political Discourses, stated: “we have no reason to think that extensive monarchy so destructive, as it is often represented.”[22]

    This essay examined the work of Montesquieu and David, both contemporaries, both concerned with philosophy and history, and both interested in eighteen-century European government. Their quintessential publications include Hume’s Essays, Moral and Political and Political Discourses plus Montesquieu’s Spirit of Laws. Although their respective writings at least superficially appear complementary, each philosopher historian offers contradictions, especially the suitability of various types of government.  While Montesquieu focused on the types of eighteenth-century government prevalent in Europe, Hume, concentrated on dissecting the character of those governments. Ultimately, both men expressed a particular interest in monarchy and representative authority.

 

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[1] Jeffrey Church, “Selfish and Moral Politics: David Hume on Stability and Cohesion in the Modern State,” The Journal of Politics 69, no.1 (February 2007): 169, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00502.x.

[2] Church, “Selfish and Moral Politics,” 170.

[3] David Hume, “That Politics may be reduc’d to a Science,” in Essays, Moral and Political (London: A. Millar, 1748), 20.

[4] David Hume, “Of the First Principles of Government,” in Essays, Moral and Political (London: A. Millar, 1748), 39.

[5] Montesquieu, “Of the Republican Government, and the Laws in relation to Democracy,” in The Spirit of Laws (Kitchener: Batoche Books, 2001), 25.

[6] Hume, “Of the First Principles of Government,” 39.

[7] Ibid., 39.

[8] Montesquieu, “Of the Relation of Laws to the Nature of Monarchical Government,” in The Spirit of Laws (Kitchener: Batoche Books, 2001), 32.

[9] David Hume, “Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences,” in Essays, Moral and Political (London: A. Miller, 1748), 161.

[10] Hume, “The Rise of Arts and Sciences,” 161.

[11] Ibid., 163.

[12] David Hume, “Of the Liberty of the Press,” in Essays, Moral and Political (London: A. Miller, 1748), 8

[13] Montesquieu, “Of the Constitution of England.” in The Spirit of Laws (Kitchener: Batoche Books, 2001), 176.

[14] Montesquieu, “Of the Constitution of England,” 177.

[15] Montesquieu, “Of the Laws in relation to the Nature of a despotic Government,” in The Spirit of Laws (Kitchener: Batoche Books, 2001), 34.

[16] Ibid., 34.

[17] Montesquieu, “Of the Laws Which Establish Political Liberty, 171.

[18] Paul Sagar, “On the Liberty of the English: Adam Smith’s Reply to Montesquieu and Hume,” Political Theory. (September 2021)

[19] Montesquieu, “Of the Laws in relation to the Nature of a despotic Government,” 175.

[20] Ibid., 178

[21] Sagar, “On the Liberty of the English.”

[22] David Hume, “On the Populousness of Ancient Nations,” in Political Discourses (Edinburgh: R. Fleming, 1752), 257.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

 

Hume, David. “Of the First Principles of Government,” in Essays, Moral and Political, 39-45. London: A. Millar, 1748.

 

Hume, David. “Of the Liberty of the Press,” in Essays, Moral and Political, 7-13. London: A. Millar, 1748.

 

Hume, David. “That Politics may be reduced to a Science,” in Essays, Moral and Political, 20-38. London: A. Millar, 1748.

 

Hume, David. “Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences,” in Essays, Moral and Political, 156-192. London: A. Miller, 1748.

 

Hume, David. “On the Populousness of Ancient Nations,” in Political Discourses, 155-216. Edinburgh: R. Fleming, 1752

 

Montesquieu, “Of the Constitution of England.” in The Spirit of Laws, Kitchener: Batoche Books, 2001.

 

Montesquieu, “Of the Laws in relation to the Nature of a despotic Government,” in The Spirit of Laws, Kitchener: Batoche Books, 2001.

 

Montesquieu, “Of the Relation of Laws to the Nature of Monarchical Government,” in The Spirit of Laws, Kitchener: Batoche Books, 2001.

 

Montesquieu, “Of the Republican Government, and the Laws in relation to Democracy,” in The Spirit of Laws, Kitchener: Batoche Books, 2001.

 

Secondary Sources

 

Church, Jeffrey. “Selfish and Moral Politics: David Hume on Stability and Cohesion in the Modern State.” The Journal of Politics 69, no. 1 (February 2007): 169–81. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00502.x.

 

Sagar, Paul. “On the Liberty of the English: Adam Smith’s Reply to Montesquieu and Hume,” Political Theory. (September 2021): https://doi-org.ezproxy.liberty.edu/10.1177/00905917211039763.